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Abstract
Contemporary military campaigns increasingly count on the use of air power.
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations have been a crucial element of
military air power for 50 years. Several developments and evolution in both air defense
and attack systems suggest that SEAD missions will continue to have growing
importance to air forces. Since SEAD operations have a significant impact on air
campaigns, it is important to examine their efficiency and identify improvement
opportunities. This study explores factors that influence SEAD operations through use of a
discrete event simulation built in Arena and subsequent statistical analysis of the results.
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DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION OF A SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR
DEFENSES (SEAD) MISSION

I. Introduction

1.1

Background
Since the first use of aircraft in combat, the ways to defend forces on the ground

has been a great challenge to the armed forces. There are reports of balloon and antiballoon artillery in the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, and in 1890 the
Russians tested a field-gun battery against a balloon moored three kilometers away. The
first airplane downed in combat fell to ground fire in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912; so
when World War I began, there were precedents for ground-based air defense (Werrell,
1988: 1).
Small arms and artilleries were used to hit the aircraft during World War I. On the
other side to make air defenses inoperative, aircraft could have made only strafing and
bombing operations. Since that time, the activities of neutralizing, destroying, or
temporarily degrading enemy air defenses has been known as suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) which led to the design and construction of aircraft systems and
weapons for that purpose. Over the years, both attacking aircraft and air defense systems
have evolved. German forces densely used anti-aircraft artilleries (AAA) during WWII.
The Allies tried several ways to neutralize the German AAA, but the most effective
solution was avoidance. With the advent of radio detecting and ranging (radar)
1

equipment, ground-based air defenses became more effective and more lethal. Towards
the end of WWII, Germany attempted to develop a surface-to-air missile (SAM), but the
technology necessary to provide guidance for a SAM was not mature enough (Neufeld,
1995: 152). Therefore, AAA continued to be the primary threat and avoiding AAA
continued to be the primary tactic throughout the Korean War. Especially in the Vietnam
War, the Soviet-built radar guided SA-2 SAM added a significant lethal dimension to air
defense. Total combat losses due to ground-based air defense systems and the growing
rate of attrition provided clear evidence that SEAD missions were highly important for
maintaining aircraft survivability and led to an increase in the number of planned SEAD
sorties. This resulted in the development of new SEAD missions and tactics against the
evolving threat. Crucial steps in the evolution of the SEAD mission to actively jam
enemy air defense systems included introduction of the EB-66 electronic warfare (EW)
aircraft and employment of the first Wild Weasel SEAD aircraft, the F-100F carrying the
AGM-45A Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM).
Afterwards SEAD missions took an important role in Arab-Israeli Wars. In
contrast to Vietnam’s single threat, Israelis fought against an air defense umbrella
consisting of a variety of systems, many with the ability to minimize the effects of
electronic counter measures (ECM) such as jamming. In 1982, two important steps in the
evolution of air defense and SEAD mission were demonstrated during the Bekaa Valley
conflict between Israel and Syria. The Syrians constructed a complicated integrated air
defense system (IADS). SAM and AAA sites were placed to build a forceful defense wall
against attacks. In response, the Israelis developed a new tactic in the SEAD mission.
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They used a combination of drones and aircrafts. Drones were flown as decoys to make
SAM radars active and then SEAD aircrafts were used to employ standoff weapons.
The next major application of the SEAD mission was the Gulf War. As opposed
to Syrian air defenses in 1982, Iraq had gathered an impressive amount of sophisticated
equipment for their IADS, including both Soviet and European systems. It consisted of
several thousand radars, approximately 10,000 pieces of AAA, up to 17,000 SAMs, and
the seventh largest air force in the world (Brungess, 1994: 38). The major concern was to
destroy or disrupt command and control centers, communication and electrical facilities
of the Iraqi IADS instead of directly attacking the SAM sites. The SEAD packages were
formed of F-4G high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) shooters, EA-6B electronic
jammers, and a large number of drones to support other air strikes. The air campaign
resulted in a disintegrated Iraqi IADS in the first two days by destroying or making
inoperative many of the radars and SAM sites.
The last major example of SEAD operations was one of the most challenging of
SEAD missions. In Kosovo, Serbians performed new tactics that they learned from
Iraqi’s experience. Instead of continuously operating their systems, they chose to change
the locations of their mobile SAMs continuously and activate them intermittently. That
fact protected their SAMs from exposure to NATO attacks. It also gave Serbian SAMs
the chance to launch surprise attacks on the Allied Forces aircraft, resulting in the loss of
an F-117 and F-16. This was resulted in that although strike aircraft were not always
threatened, there was a requirement for a full complement of NATO SEAD assets
airborne to support every strike package (Lum, 1999: 38).

3

Since the first use of aircraft in combat and the first response given from the
ground, it was obvious that the fight between aircraft and air defense would continue for
a long time. This is evident today with the continuing development of new weapons and
improved tactics. Going forward into the 21st century SEAD missions will continue to
mature with specialized aircraft to execute these important parts of the air campaign.

1.2

Research Problem
Contemporary military campaigns increasingly count on the use of air power.

SEAD operations have been a crucial element of military air campaigns for 50 years.
Several developments and evolution in both air defense and attack systems suggest that
SEAD missions will continue to have growing importance to air forces. Twenty to thirty
percent of all combat sorties in the recent three major conflicts were devoted to SEAD
missions (Bolkcom, 2005: 5). Since SEAD operations have a significant impact on air
campaigns, it is a necessity to determine their efficiency and improvement opportunities.

1.3

Research Objective
This study describes a method for modeling SEAD air combat operations in a

discrete event simulation environment. The objective of this research is to present a
flexible and responsive model by using discrete-event simulation to investigate the means
of neutralizing, degrading, jamming or destroying ground-based air defense systems.
Researching the efficiency of missions and commenting on the results for different
scenarios are additional objectives of this study.

4

1.4

Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter two reviews simulation

literature, combat modeling, and previous studies on related subjects. Chapter three
defines the structure of the model, how it is built in Arena®, and gives some detailed
information of the model. In chapter four, model results and conclusions are presented.
The last chapter pulls together highlights from all chapters and makes some conclusions
and recommendations for future research.

5

II. Literature Review

2.1

Systems and Models
A system is defined to be a collection of entities or components that interact with

each other and with the environment in an attempt to achieve some goal (Hartman, 1985).
Military systems fall into this defined category. The entities or components of the
military systems might be aircraft, weapons, troops, or various sized units such as
squadrons or battalions.
Systems can be categorized in two types, discrete and continuous. A discrete
system is one for which the state variables change instantaneously at separated points in
time. A continuous system is one for which the state variables change continuously with
respect to time (Law, 2007: 70). If an aircraft is taken into consideration, it moves
through the air in continuous time, but it can be modeled using a discrete event model to
gain the convenience of computer programming and efficiency of computer operation
(Hartman, 1985). Only a few systems are totally discrete or continuous but can typically
be modeled as either to achieve the objectives of the study.
We often usually study complex systems to discover the characteristics of how
they operate. A common objective in these studies is to analyze the behavior of the
systems when different conditions or inputs are applied. With these studies we can gain
information about the internal processes and relationships between the components of the
systems. Thus we can make some predictions about the performance of the systems under
new and untested conditions. Figure 1 (Law, 2007: 4) shows different ways in which a
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System

Experiment with the
actual system

Experiment with a
model of the system

Physical
model

Mathematical
model

Analytical
solution

Simulation

Figure 1. Ways to study a system (Law, 2007: 4)
system might be studied. Our discussion focuses on cases where we cannot experiment
with the actual system. If it is possible and cost-effective to build a physical model of the
system this can be the best way to get valid results for system performance under new
conditions. For many systems such as military operations, it is not feasible to build a
physical model of the system being studied. For these reasons, the behavior of military
systems by means of mathematical modeling is studied.
A model of a real system is a representation of some of the components of the
system and of some of their actions and interrelationships which is useful for describing
or predicting the behavior of the system (within a reasonable range of inputs) (Hartman,
1985). When using a model, an important question to be answered is the validity of the
model. Since no model can represent the real system perfectly, how closely it reflects the
system and the accuracy of the outputs in regards to the model’s purpose are the main
issues for validity. Validity will be discussed in more detail later.
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After deciding to construct a mathematical model of a system, the next step is to
determine whether an analytical solution or simulation is more appropriate. If the model
is simple enough, exact analytical solutions can be reached. But if an analytical solution
to a mathematical model is not available or if such a solution requires a large amount of
time and/or other resources, simulation emerges as the preferred method. Since most
military systems are highly complex, it is generally impossible to model them using an
analytical approach. Therefore, simulations are used in the analysis of military systems.

2.2

Combat Models and Their Classification
As defined before, a model is a simplified representation of some components of a

system and some of their interactions which is useful in describing or predicting the
behavior of the system. A combat model, usually a simulation model, is specialized to
capture elements of military operations for investigative purposes or resources
management purposes (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671). It is useful and helpful to
classify combat models for a better understanding. Although there are several ways to
make this classification, Hartman’s (1985) classification is used to classify them in this
study.

Dynamic vs. Static
A static model represents a system at only a particular time, or represents a
system where time has no effect. On the other hand, a dynamic model represents a system
where time clearly plays a role. Monte Carlo models and a model of the lethality of a
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single missile could be given as examples of static models. Most operational models and
modeling of air combat are dynamic models.

Continuous vs. Discrete
In continuous models, state variables change continuously with respect to time. In
discrete models, the state variables change instantaneously at separate points in time. In
other words, the system can change at only a countable number of points in time. A
discrete model can be used to model a continuous system. Many combat processes are
continuous, but can be modeled using a discrete event model. The specific objectives of
the study and the preference of the personnel programming the simulation are the main
reasons in selecting a discrete model over a continuous model or vice versa. Although
there are several examples of simulation software such as Simulink® and ACSL for
building continuous models, the discrete-event simulation (DES) package Arena® as
well as other commercial DES packages have continuous modeling capabilities as well.

Deterministic vs. Stochastic
If a model does not contain any probabilistic components or random effects, it is
called deterministic. In a stochastic model, there is always some random input or process.
If a missile is shot with the same parameters each time and it reaches the target in the
same way, this model is deterministic. If the impact point is not known, then the accuracy
of the missile might be modeled stochastically. A model can have both deterministic and
stochastic inputs in different components to simulate both the certainty and randomness
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of real life. If any portion of a system is modeled stochastically, the output of the model
is also stochastic.

Descriptive vs. Prescriptive
A descriptive model describes how a system will operate if values for all of the
input variables and decision rules are given by the model user (Hartman, 1985).
Queueing models, inventory models and most combat simulation models are descriptive.
A weaponeering program used to evaluate different munitions against a specific target to
achieve the highest probability of kill (Pk) is an example of a descriptive model. A
prescriptive model specifies how the system ought to operate to achieve some objective
(Hartman, 1985). Prescriptive models are optimization problems with decision variables
determined by solving the model for the given parameters of the problem. Linear
programming, integer programming and network problem models are prescriptive
models. A weaponeering program could also be used as a prescriptive model if you allow
the model to select a weapon/target pairing given an objective function and constraints.

High Resolution vs. Aggregated
Combat models can also be classified by scope. Combat models are typically
grouped using a multi-tiered or hierarchical family of models. This model hierarchy
(Figure 2) is often displayed as a pyramid (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671).
In this model hierarchy, combat models are placed at levels based on resolution
and aggregation. Resolution is the degree of detail and precision used in the
representation of real world aspects in a model or simulation (Department of Defense,
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1995). A high resolution combat model (engineering level) is a combination of detailed
interactions of individual combatants or weapon systems. The lowest level of the pyramid
contains engineering levels of the detailed system representations. The next level presents
the system as a combination of these detailed sub-units and includes the details of an
engagement between a small number of platforms.

Increasing
Aggregation
CAMPAIGN

Higher
Resolution

MISSION
ENGAGEMENT
ENGINEERING

Figure 2. Combat Model Hierarchy
Above that, the mission level contains models where the systems begin to interact
with a larger number of other systems. This level represents multiple-unit engagements or
battles. These kinds of models give the operational performance of the systems. At the
top of the pyramid, we find aggregated or low resolution combat models developed to
model combat at the campaign level. An aggregated combat model is a model of larger
units gathered from individual combatants with the loss of some detailed information. At
this level, a major theatre war including joint and coalition forces over an extended
period of time could be modeled.
At the bottom of the pyramid, high resolution models show the detailed
representation of combat and represent small units. As we move up the pyramid, some
11

details are left out and the models become more abstract and entities begin to represent
larger units. Similarly, as we move from bottom to the top of the pyramid the stochastic
structure of high resolution models shifts into a more deterministic type of aggregated
models.
Weapon versus passive target models are generally engineering level models to
discover the accuracy and lethality of a weapon system against particular targets by
emphasizing its hardware characteristics. One-on-one or few-on-few models are usually
stochastic models between representing weapon systems in simplified engagement
scenarios to represent the tradeoffs between the weapon systems. Combined arms task
force models are generally stochastic and high resolution models that represent individual
combatants and their detailed interactions at battalion level. The emphasis of these
models is to determine the contribution of a particular system to overall force
effectiveness. Mission specialty models represent a high resolution of a particular aspect
or capability of a unit while considering the remaining capabilities of the same unit in
less detail. Division level force models emphasize the force structure and the command
and control functions of a division, since a division is the lowest level organization which
has its own fire support and logistics. Campaign models have the largest number of
participants including land, air, and naval combatants. The scenarios can last for months,
thus deployment and logistics sides of war should be taken into consideration in these
models. These models are highly aggregated and often deterministic with an emphasis on
logistics, allocation and command and control of forces.
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2.3

The Uses and Purposes of Combat Models
Combat models have a wide range of variety and uses. Today many countries’

armed forces use combat modeling. Combat modeling as a tool for decision making can
provide a more economic and effective means to evaluate alternatives and as an aid in
determining appropriate force structures and capabilities. In addition, combat models can
be used to educate staff officers and as a training aid in many different areas.
As the technology develops, new military weapon systems continue to improve
and the cost of them continues to increase. While optimizing the design and maintaining
the quality, reducing these costs is a principle area of concern for many countries.
Combat modeling and simulation is one of the ways to approach this problem. New
weapon systems and justifications are usually modeled by high resolution models. These
models give a high level of description of the new systems using a variety of stochastic
components. At the same time, they help in understanding the contribution of the system
to mission effectiveness. These models may also be used to help evaluate new and
modified tactics for the operators (Hartman, 1985). Different tactical developments can
be tried and evaluated to find out the best or most effective under various conditions.
Combat models are also used to analyze the ability of different types of forces and
major weapon systems for total force structuring. To understand the contribution of an
existing unit or new weapon system, it can be modeled in a campaign level model. Such
models can be used to evaluate unit size and composition to provide decision makers with
a better idea about the structure and capability of the total force.

13

Another major area where combat models can be used is for training personnel.
These models can contain military tasks to be evaluated and practiced by a specific staff.
Models used for training often run in real time and allow for human interaction.
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) is a simulation architecture used by the
military for conducting real-time platform level war gaming across multiple host
computers. It was first designed in support of the US Army Simulator Network
(SIMNET) program for tank training by the sponsorship of the United States Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) in the early 1990’s. DIS consists of
autonomous simulation entities such as battlefield, environment, and simulation support
entities interacting in real time across networks. DIS transmits only the information for
change in the state of entities across networks. It provides an open architecture where
anyone can play. It is operable among different, virtual, live and constructive simulations.
It facilitates development, training, mission planning and rehearsal.
As described above, different uses of combat models intend to achieve particular
purposes. Military analysts frequently use models to evaluate future combat systems. For
any combat modeling study there is always a tradeoff between time, cost and risk. Time
may be the most limited resource in searching for the best answer for an ongoing combat
operation or for training personnel in a specific task within a constrained environment.
Cost-efficiency is a crucial concern in many Operations Research (OR) studies. Since
military technology is the most expensive industrial area in the world, achieving the best
capability at the lowest cost is a great challenge for the researchers and developers. The
risk of being unsuccessful in combat clearly has a large impact on combat attrition.
Combat models can be used to better understand what factors affect the level of risk and
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how to reduce it. Although a model is not a perfect and exact representation of the real
world, it can still provide insight on the relative merits of various courses of action for the
decision maker.
Thus, the purposes of combat modeling can be summarized in two basic
categories; analysis and training. Studies regarding development and effectiveness of
weapon systems, force capability, and development of tactics, doctrine, strategy and
policy are all common analysis areas. Another analysis area is operations support tools
for helping to make decisions. In the training or education part, there are two main parts.
One of them is the skills development for individuals or teams and the other is exercise
drivers.

2.4

Model Verification, Validation and Accreditation
One of the most difficult concerns in modeling that developers or users of these

models have to face is determining whether a model is an accurate representation of the
actual system. This problem can be solved by the steps of verification, validation and
accreditation (VV&A).
Model verification is the process of determining that a model implementation and
its associated data accurately represent the developer's conceptual description and
specifications (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). Debugging the simulation computer
program is a simple form of verification. In essence, verification seeks to ensure that the
model is built right.
Model validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model and
its associated data provide an accurate representation of the real world from the
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perspective of the intended uses of the model (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). In
short, validation ensures that the right model was built. If a simulation is valid, then it can
be used to make decisions about the system. An important point about model validity is
that a valid model for one purpose may not be valid for another. Simulation models
should always be built for specific purposes. Another important point about validation is
that it is not a one time process undertaken at the end of model development, but an
ongoing process conducted throughout model development.
Accreditation is a concept introduced by U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in
recent years. It is the official certification by a model user that a model, simulation, or
federation of models and simulations and its associated data is acceptable for use for a
specific purpose (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). Accreditation assures that the
model user takes responsibility for the decision to employ a model for a particular
application and to make official conclusions based upon model results.
Credibility is also a related principle. If decision makers accept a simulation
model and its results as correct and are willing to use the model results, that model can be
deemed as credible. A credible model is not necessarily valid, and it might not be used as
an aid in making decisions. In essence, credibility implies that the model provides
believable results and is strongly influenced by model use by other organizations.
There are four basic approaches for deciding whether a simulation model is valid.
Each of the approaches requires the model development team to conduct verification and
validation (V&V) as part of the model development process (Sargent, 2005). In the first
approach, which is frequently used, the model development team makes the V&V
determination. Another approach leaves the V&V determination with the users of the
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model. The third approach uses an outside team independent of both developers and users
of the model to make the V&V decision. The last and rarely used approach incorporates a
scoring model with subjective scores or weights for various aspects of the model and then
accepts the model as valid if overall score meets or exceeds some passing score.
Some of the verification and validation techniques are presented here. Common
verification techniques include writing and debugging a simulation program in
subprograms, reviewing the program with more than one person, and running the model
under several sets of input parameters and checking the results for reasonableness. One of
the most powerful techniques that can be used to debug a discrete-event simulation
program is a trace (Law, 2007: 249). In a trace, the states of the system are compared
with hand calculations to check the operations of the program continue as intended.
Operational validation is determining whether the simulation model’s output
behavior has the accuracy required for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of
the model’s intended applicability (Sargent, 2005). There are three basic approaches to
make these comparisons. The first one is subjective using graphical comparisons such as
histograms, box plots and scatter plots. Confidence intervals (CI) and hypothesis tests are
the remaining two approaches that provide more reliable and objective results. Both
confidence intervals and hypothesis tests can be used to compare means, variances, and
distributions of the model outputs against the system outputs.

2.5

Previous Research
Many simulations involving air combat are modeled using special combat

modeling software tools. These combat modeling tools are often produced for only US
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release which means limited application. The software used in this study, Arena® is a
discrete-event simulation (DES) package and has no restrictions for use by Non-US
students. Our discussion focuses on some research about air defense and SEAD that does
not use special purpose combat models.
Measuring the effectiveness of radar and infrared sensors in anti-air warfare area
defense (Kulac, 1999) is an example of component-based DES developed in Java® using
the Simkit simulation package. Analysis of ship self air defense system selection (Turan,
1999) is another Java® application using the Modkit simulation package.
A simulation analysis of a SEAD operation (Haugen, 1998) is another application
of Simkit. Haugen conducted a study to evaluate the impact of intelligence delay on a
SEAD operation. The results showed that the effectiveness of a SEAD operation is
sensitive to information delay but the effective variable is the number of allocated SEAD
aircraft.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) mission level simulation (Walston, 1999) is a
DES study written in Java® using the Silk® simulation package. In that research, an
object oriented simulation was developed to model the surveillance and active SEAD
missions of UAVs. Analysis examined the effect of speed, endurance, and weather
susceptibility on UAV operational effectiveness and the effects of radar cross section,
threat density, and threat lethality on UAV SEAD mission performance.
Simulation analysis of UAV (Heath, 1999) is another DES example for an air
platform. Analyzing mine avoidance tactics for autonomous underwater vehicles (Allen,
2004), dynamic allocation of weapons and sensors to ground targets (Havens, 2002), and
waterfront force protection (Childs, 2002) are some other studies relating movement and
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detection in DES. Simulation of autonomic logistics system sortie generation (Faas,
2003) and a DES model for reusable military launch vehicle prelaunch operations
(Stiegelmeier, 2006) are some combat models built with Arena® .
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III. Methodology

3.1

Introduction
This chapter describes the discrete event simulation model of a SEAD mission

built for this research effort. It gives an overview of a simplified scenario which SEAD
missions are tasked to attack an air defense system. The following sections contain model
selection, model structure and description, and several assumptions made in the model.

3.2

Model Selection
The purpose of building a simulation model is to create a tool that produces

necessary data for the researchers. Thus, selecting a model should be as simple as
possible, but at the same time it should give a sufficient level of detail. The researcher has
two options in this sense; one of them is to use an existing model and the other is to
develop a new one. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are not many examples
where a researcher builds a combat model from scratch using discrete event simulation
software. On the other hand, the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT) contains
a number of legacy models designed to model combat at the engagement and mission
level. One of these models is Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM). This model
is a mission level simulation used to assess effectiveness of many defense systems. It can
be used to model a variety of scenarios including SEAD missions and other air defense
operations. Another mission level model is System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation
(SEAS) which helps to assess the impact of proposed systems in terms of high level
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combat outcomes. However, these models have important disadvantages such as being
very large and complex. Many of these combat modeling tools were produced with
limited release outside of the US and is not necessarily available to international students.
The simulation model in this research was developed in the Arena® software
package which is a commercial tool and available to all students. It is a discrete event
simulation model designed for analyzing the performance of and the impact of changes
on complex systems associated with supply chain, manufacturing, logistics, distribution
and warehousing, and other areas. In the following sections, we present how a combat
model was built in Arena® and the other details about a SEAD mission.

3.3

Model Description and Structure
Mission success is generally evaluated by two important measures in air to ground

(A/G) employment. These two factors are target destruction and force survival. There are
also several basic factors to be taken into consideration while planning A/G missions,
such as enemy defenses, terrain, weather, target vulnerability, force requirements,
navigation, and formations. There is no single approved solution to any tactical situation.
Choosing reasonable, unpredictable tactics is the key in planning any A/G mission.
A/G missions can be created by flight packages with more than one flight or type
of aircraft. Each flight must understand the mission objectives to be successful. There are
two basic objectives for A/G missions. These objectives are target destruction and force
survival where they influence flight planning through all phases of the mission. Factors
considered during the mission planning process include mission objectives given in the
air tasking order (ATO), rules of engagement (ROE) or special instructions (SPINS),
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intelligence information, weather, terrain, weaponeering, navigation, communication,
force requirements, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). If attackers are
tasked to enter a threat ring or attack a threat site, they have to plan the mission with
available SEAD assets. If there are no SEAD assets available to be tasked, an alternative
way is tasking some of the allocated forces to the SEAD role. At this point, the vital role
of SEAD missions and attacking a threat with or without SEAD assets can be noticed
easily.
Offensive counter air (OCA) operations are aimed against essential targets of the
enemy's air power. These targets include air defense control facilities; defensive missile
complexes; command, control, communications, and computer (C4) facilities; airfield
and supporting facilities; aircraft on the ground; and munitions and missile storage sites.
OCA missions against air defense elements are called suppression of enemy air defenses
(SEAD) which seeks to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy surface based
air defenses by disruptive or destructive means. Disruptive SEAD involves a temporary
disruption of enemy air defense assets. Employing a high speed anti-radiation missile
(HARM), electronic warfare (EW), and information attack (IA) are the execution types of
disruptive SEAD. EW involves the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy such as jamming or deception, and
employment of anti-radiation weapons or weapons using electromagnetic energy.
Destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) is one step beyond suppression and includes
the physical destruction of enemy air defense assets through the use of conventional
bombs and contemporary weapons such as cruise missiles. However, DEAD was not
explicitly considered in this study.
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Building a model is an art and requires a conscious effort. The modeler must
make good decisions in selecting the right functional relationships, the best modeling
techniques, the right scenarios, and the sources of inputs to get accurate results to aid the
decision maker in forming conclusions about the system being modeled. Thus, the
modeler should have knowledge of the simulation tool and an experience in the military
operation to be modeled. After combining these factors, the modeler first takes steps to
design the structure of a combat model. These include determining the purpose of the
study, generating the appropriate combat scenario, defining the entities, their attributes
(characteristics) and the events related to them. Once the model structure is defined, the
modeler moves on to execution details such as battle initialization, specific processes to
model (such as search, movement, and detection), battle termination, and required model
outputs.
This structure gives an idea about the main processes of a combat model and how
these processes are flowing in an existing model. A successful combat model scenario
usually creates entities which perform the main processes: movement, searching,
detecting and engaging. This provides the same logic and flow chart for each combatant
side of the model (Figure 3).
A simplified SEAD mission was developed in Arena® for this research. This
model is used to discover relationships and derive conclusions depending on input
parameters. It is designed for analysis, with no objective concerning training. The model
can’t be interrupted or given different directions after execution begins. The current
version of the model doesn’t have a Graphical User Interface (GUI). As a result, all input
parameters must be set directly in the code.
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Figure 3. The Decision Making Flow Chart (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671)
This model is dynamic and has an event stepped time mechanism. It represents
both stochastic and deterministic features with its characteristics. While constructing the
model, most of the effort was consumed to get a realistic as well as a flexible model. But
building a more realistic model means the modeler must include more details. Thus, some
assumptions were made to keep the model simple and responsive. These assumptions will
be explained in the following section.

3.4

Model Assumptions and Details
When executing an air strike or an air-to-surface offensive counter air mission

against specific targets in the battle area, the mission commander needs different types of
aircraft and flights to compose a traditional package to ensure minimum attrition. SEAD
and EW aircraft, air to air (A/A) and air to ground (A/G) flights are some typical
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examples of a package. This model deals with only the units that carry and launch air to
surface weapons for attackers and air defense units that carry and launch surface to air
weapons for defenders.
A two-sided (Blue and Red) combat model was built for this research. The entities
created for both Blue and Red are complete weapon systems that have some attributes
and can move and interact with entities from the other side. The battle area is defined to
be 100x100x5 miles and is represented in a x-y-z coordinate system. The geographic
positions of both sides do not have an impact on the results of the battle with the Blue
side located on the east side of the area and attack in the direction from east to west. Also
there are no obstacles assumed to create any terrain factor. The battle time is determined
as 10 days. There are three sorties flown each day and after each sortie both units are
regenerated disregarding previous sortie attrition.
The main model consists of two major parts and an additional part to capture the
outputs (Figure 4). In the first part, the Red SAM sites, the Red targets and the Blue A/G
flights associated with these targets are created. HARMs, the search and attack patterns
of both the Red air defense units and HARMs and the movement and attack phases of
Blue A/G flights are built in the second part. The following paragraphs will go into detail
about these two major parts.
In the first part, the entities are the units of air defense systems for the Red side.
Basically, an air defense system has different categories of units. These include early
warning, air surveillance, ground control intercept (GCI), SAM system acquisition, SAM
system fire control, AAA fire control radars, engagement control stations, missile launch
stations, and long, medium or short range SAMs according to the capability of the
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Figure 4. Main model
system. Since HARMs are anti-radiation missiles, the radars are the primary concerns and
targets of SEAD flights. There are no particularly named air defense systems, weapons or
aircrafts in this model. All of the players were intuitively created and given their
important specifications only in numbers.
The Red air defense system is tasked to defend an area 100 x 100 miles with two
SAM sites. This does not mean all the area should be covered by the defense umbrella.
All air defense units are considered mobile, but they need to be stationary to operate. For
each sortie, the defense systems are settled on a random location to defend two, four, or
six strategic targets against SEAD and A/G flights (Figure 5). Those specific locations of
the air defense systems were used as the main target positions for HARMs and missile
launcher positions for A/G flights to avoid. The ranges of SAM sites are also determined
randomly for each sortie. Although the ranges of two SAM sites are different from each
other, the search patterns and the probabilities of detection and kill are the same.
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Figure 5. SAM Positions Submodel

After generating air defense systems and strategic targets, the Blue side attacking
units and their initial positions were created according to the related targets (Figure 6).
For each target, four Blue A/G attack aircraft are created. All targets are placed randomly
in the range of the air defense system. This implies every A/G flight has to enter the area

Figure 6. Targets and Strikers Submodel
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in the range of the air defense system and become vulnerable to missiles of air defense
systems. At the same time, Red air defense systems have to be exposed to Blue HARM
missiles when they are trying to defend their strategic assets by operating their radars and
attacking Blue A/G flights with their missiles. Thus a combat environment and attrition
for both sides are created in the model.
In the same assignment modules, mathematical calculations are made for attackers
(Figure 7). These are the calculations of vector velocities of attackers that help to move
on to their assigned targets, calculations of times indicating when the attackers can reach
to their targets, enter the threat zone and exit it. The A/G aircraft are assumed to fly at a
constant velocity of 480 knots and execute a low altitude operation at 500 feet above
ground level (AGL). A/G flights also fly in an offset box formation to make a time and
altitude deconfliction between the elements. There is also some important information
gathered for SEAD flights to help them generate a timeline for HARM launches in the
second major part of the model.

Figure 7. Calculation Assign Modules for A/G Aircraft
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In the other part of the model, the entities are Blue HARMs that interact with the
air defense systems of the Red side. These missiles are being launched from SEAD
aircraft which are not modeled as separate entities. SEAD flight carries and launches
eight missiles at each run. They usually do not enter the range of the threat and get
exposed to the Red air defense missiles. They are assumed to form an imaginary box in
the air which is called a SEAD box to provide deconfliction with the other Blue flights.
SEAD aircraft are not involved with the battle directly, thus they are not vulnerable to the
SAMs of the Red side.
After HARMs are created as entities for Blue side, there is a decide module to
demonstrate the probability of some failures with HARM missiles or SEAD aircrafts.
This module cancels some missiles by chance and shows the effect of an unplanned
failure of missiles in the air during combat (Figure 8).

Figure 8. HARM Failure Rate Submodel
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Afterwards, the allocation of HARMs to every SAM site is accomplished related
to the A/G vulnerable times calculated in the first part of the model (Figure 9). Logic
changes are associated with vulnerability times of attackers and make the distribution in
three different ways. The eight HARMs are divided into 6 to 2, 5 to 3 and 4 to 4 missiles
for each SAM site. This process also contains the calculations of time over targets (TOT)
of each missile against Red SAM sites. HARMs are not launched reactively. The
accuracy and flow of intelligence information and electronic order of battle (EOB)
updates are assumed to be at a sufficient degree to make SEAD flights plan their shots
prior to vulnerable times of A/G aircraft. Thus, all eight HARMs are already launched
even if both SAM sites are hit by previous missiles.

Figure 9. HARM Allocations Submodel
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SEAD flight takes an initial launch position in the battle area according to the
locations of the Red air defense units for the first HARM. After that they move to a new
position in a calculated time which is related to the velocity of SEAD aircraft and the
time between two consecutive HARM shots for the remaining shots. They remain in their
SEAD box while they are making their orbits and preparing for new launches (Figure
10).

Figure 10. SEAD Box Submodel
SEAD flight determines the location of the SEAD box to bring the flight as near
as possible to both SAM sites without entering Red missile ranges. There are two options
to determine the location of the SEAD box. One is from the north and the other is from
the east. There is logic to determine the placement of the box according to the locations
and ranges of SAM sites to get the nearest and safe position (Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Logic of SEAD Box Location

After determining all the first locations of SAM sites, targets, A/G and SEAD
flights and getting all the calculations related to time for A/G flight and HARM TOTs,
the combat begins. The search and detection process of SAM sites continues from the
first aircraft’s entering time to threat area until the last aircraft’s egress time (Figure 12).

Figure 12. SAM & HARM Search Patterns Submodel
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In this scenario, the air defense units are attacked by only SEAD aircraft carrying
HARMs. Other types of military units playing a role in a SEAD mission are omitted.
There are no other DEAD or A/G attacking assets carrying weapons to destroy air
defense system units. EW assets only protect the SEAD flight and they are not assigned
to destroy enemy air defense units.
The attackers were considered with their conventional or modern weapons against
only Red A/G targets in the range of air defense units. SAM sites can only engage the
attacking aircraft. Red air defense units cannot operate all the time because of the threat
of HARMs. A stochastic detection model was developed for their operation. Their
operational time is simulated by a triangular distribution. SAM sites are assumed to get a
lock on only one target and launch one missile at a time. They can get different detection
opportunities referred to as glimpses related to time intervals between search patterns.
There is also another associated probability that varies in accordance with the skill level
of SAM operators. For instance, a high level operator needs less time than a low level
operator to detect and get a lock on the target.
After making detection, the operators launch a missile to hit the Blue attackers.
They can engage just one target at each shot. The probability of detection depends on the
distance and directions of the aircraft to the SAM sites. Once entering the threat area, the
Blue attackers have a high probability of being hit by SAMs because they are moving
toward the threat. The aircraft fly on a smooth surface and are not terrain masked. They
are not assumed to make any defensive maneuver against SAM locks and launches which
results in more attrition for the Blue side. On the other side, while executing the egress
phase, their speed will be higher and they will show the aft of their aircraft which
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decreases the probability of detection. Different values of probability of detection were
applied to ingress and egress phases of the attack.

3.5

Movement and Detection in DES
Movement and detection are crucial issues that should be taken into consideration

while building a combat model using a discrete event tool. Most of the time, both
movement and detection have been done in time-stepped models. Time does not advance
in regular intervals in discrete event simulation as the simulation time is moved to the
time of next event. Although it seems hard and infeasible, there is a way to do both
movement and detection in a discrete event approach (Buss and Sanchez, 2005).
In this research, there are SEAD flights and A/G attackers moving after the start
of battle. They are assumed to fly at a constant speed of 480 knots and at a fixed altitude
of 20,000 feet for SEAD aircraft and 500 feet for attackers. They have a linear two
dimensional motion which is the simplest possible movement in a discrete event
simulation.
Any aircraft starts its move at an initial position x0 related to its assigned target at
the beginning time of the battle t0 with a constant velocity vector v. The velocity vector is
computed related to the assigned targets of the aircraft to ensure they proceed to their
targets. Storing initial position, time to start moving, and velocity vector of any moving
entity are enough to determine the new location of the aircraft. The new location of any
aircraft at time t will be computed by this equation of motion:
r
x0 + (t − t0 )v
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(1)

To find the TOT of an attacker, relative velocity is used. Since the target is stationary and
its velocity is zero, the equation of motion relative to the target will give the TOT:

t=

(x

− xtgt )
r
vag

ag

(2)

There is no need to store current locations of the aircraft at all times since they are not
being detected every second of the simulation time. These computations are made only
when a SAM site has an opportunity to detect and ask the location of the aircraft.
The cookie-cutter sensor is the simplest way of detection in a discrete event
modeling, and is used in this study (Buss and Sanchez, 2005). Air defense units should
not move while operating, that means the sensors of the SAM sites are stationary and
each of A/G attacking aircrafts are the moving targets. Again at time t0 the aircraft starts
at point xo and proceeds with velocity vector v to its target. It is important to note that
position and velocity calculations are made relative to the sensor. The main concern is to
find the detection time td at which the aircraft enters the sensor’s range. The position of
the aircraft at the time of detection is given by the following formula.

r
x0 + t d v

(3)

The detection will occur when the distance between aircraft and sensor equals the range,
R, of the sensor. Thus equation 3 becomes

r
x0 + t v

(4)

Then by completing the calculation of the length of this vector gives the solution to td

t=−

r
x⋅v
v

2

±

r2
2
2
v ( R 2 − x ) + (x ⋅ v )
v
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2

(5)

With the condition that the expression under the radical being non-negative, this equation
will give two real and positive values for t. The smaller value is the answer for time
detection td and the bigger one is for the egress time that aircraft exits the threat range te.
There is only one exception from the cookie-cutter logic in this model. After the
aircraft come upon their targets and drop their weapons, they do not follow the same
direction in the threat area to move on as seen in the Figure 13.

Figure 13. Cookie-Cutter Detection
To decrease the vulnerability and the chance to be detected by SAM sites, they
use a different velocity vector named egress vector in the model to accomplish egress
phase as soon as possible. They use the shortest path towards the safe area and minimize
the total unprotected time in the threat zone.
The movement of A/G flights and their detection by SAM sites is briefly
described here. The detection of SAM sites by HARMs follow the same cookie-cutter
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logic. This time the entity in the sensor role, HARM, is moving, and the player in the
target role, SAM sites, are stationary. HARM sensor begins to search the location of the
SAMs at a calculated amount of time after launch. When the sensor of HARM receives
any emission by the threats, it begins homing to the target. Once the homing is initiated,
it flies a dive trajectory and arms its proximity fuse until it approaches the target and hits
the target. HARM also has flexible logic and chooses the next highest priority target in its
target list if it doesn’t detect its primary target.

3.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, we defined an overview of a simplified scenario of a SEAD

mission. We described the reasons for selecting the software, steps taken while building
our model in a DES environment, a brief detail of the model structure, and the
assumptions made to make the model reasonable. Results and analysis from our model
are discussed in the next chapter.
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IV. Results and Analysis

4.1

Introduction
The previous chapter defined the model built for this research. This chapter

includes model results and analysis. In the first section, the factors and output data used
in the model are introduced and determining the appropriate length and number of
replications of the model to produce these output data is explained. The following
sections include the design of experiments (DOE) and regression analysis of the main
model, comparisons made between different competing systems on the basis of key
performance measures, and the analysis of responses from the model.

4.2

Measures of Effectiveness
Various numbers of outputs could be obtained from a mission level simulation.

The detailed model can easily give different performance measures from the results. In a
combat environment, every unit has distinctive key measures to calculate their own
performances. The performance values of each mission, number of attritions, number of
ammunitions fired, number of targets detected, and number of targets destroyed are the
most usual measures of effectiveness (MOE) in combat modeling. In this study, some of
the outputs we captured are mission success for each mission, survivability score, overall
success which is a combination of mission success values and survivability score, killed
SAMs, detected A/G aircraft, killed A/G aircraft, killed targets, number of HARMs fired,
total vulnerability time for A/G aircraft, total coverage time provided by SEAD flight.
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Overall success (OS) is one of the most important MOEs considered in this
research. As mentioned before, overall success is a calculated combination of the scores
of each mission success and survivability. The mission success is calculated according to
the number of targets killed by A/G strikers. The survivability score is another measure
which gives the number of A/G strikers alive at the end of each sortie. Although the
military commanders usually determine the weights of these measures related to the
importance level of each one in the combat, the largest weight (75%) is given to mission
success. These measures could practically be changed in the code when it’s required.
The objective for half width variation for the mean of key MOEs is plus or minus
1%. The main model was run for 10 days and three sorties were accomplished for each
day which gives us 30 sorties per one replication. The length of one replication was
determined related to the duration of operational exercises such as Red Flag or Anatolian
Eagle. First we ran the model for ten replications and captured an estimated variance to
implement that value into the following equation. This formula assumes that as we
increase the number of replications our estimate of the population variance will not
change and we can reach an approximate expression for the total number of replications
required to achieve a desired half-width.

⎧⎪
⎫⎪
S 2 (n )
∗
na (β ) = min ⎨i ≥ n : t i −1,1−α 2
≤ β⎬
i
⎪⎩
⎭⎪

(6)

na* is the number of additional replications needed to obtain a half width which is less
than or equal to β which is equal to one in this study. S2(n) denotes the variance with the
present replication number and i denotes the iterative increase in the number of
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replications. The number of replications were iteratively increased and finally reached the
value of 25.

4.3

Design of Experiments and Regression Analysis
After determining the number of replications and the replication length, the level

of critical factors was determined that allow examination of the varying outputs. Four
different main factors affected the outputs directly in the model. These factors are SAM
on-air rate (SOR), HARM failure rate (HFR), skill level of SAM operators (SLO) in
terms of seconds to react to A/G aircraft, and the number of A/G targets for each SAM
site (NTG). These factors have two different levels for their low and high values. A 2k
factorial design is constructed to determine which factor has the greatest impact on the
process and the key MOE OS. Arena®’s Process Analyzer is used to capture the
necessary outputs. The main factors and their low and high values are shown in Table 1.
Only NTG used a center level with a value of 4. A 31x23 factorial design was constructed
(Table 2).
Table 1. Main Factors and Levels
Factors

Low

High

SOR

50%

100%

HFR

1%

25%

SLO

30 sec.

10 sec.

NTG

2

6
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Table 2. Design Points
NTG
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

SOR
50%
50%
50%
50%
100%
100%
100%
100%
50%
50%
50%
50%
100%
100%
100%
100%
50%
50%
50%
50%
100%
100%
100%
100%

SLO
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.
10 sec.
10 sec.
30 sec.
30 sec.

HFR
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%
1%
25%

After 25 replications of the model for each 24 design points, key response variable
OS values were collected. All these input and output variables are implemented in a
multiple linear regression model to find out the relationship between these variables and
the response variable. Multiple linear regression model attempts to find out this
relationship by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This linear equation provides a
regression line which describes how the mean response changes with explanatory
variables. The observed values for response variable vary about their means and are
assumed to have the same standard deviation. The fitted values estimate the parameters of
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the population regression line. Since the observed values vary about their means, the
multiple regression model includes residuals for this variation. The residuals are the
deviations of the observed values from their means, which are assumed to be normally
and independently distributed with a mean of zero and some constant variance. These
assumptions are checked later.
By using Minitab statistical package, the stepwise regression technique is applied
to determine which variables have a significant contribution to the multiple regression
linear model. Four main factors in the model were applied first and had a very low
predictive model. Interactions were added between these variables to obtain a more
predictive model. Adding new variables to a regression equation will always increase our
R2 value, which gives the proportion of the variability in the response that is fitted by the
model, even when the new variables have no predictive capability. However, the adjusted
R2 value corrects this difficulty. When new variables are added to the regression
equation, the adjusted R2 value does not increase, if the new variables have no additional
predictive capability.
Other useful exploratory analysis tools for factorial experiments include main
effects plots and interaction plots. Figure 14 shows the main effects plot for the response.
This plot provides the information about how a factor contributes to the model without
any interaction between the other factors.
The end points of the lines are the mean of response values at high or low levels
of that factor’s design points. The change in the mean of responses between levels of a
factor is illustrated through the slopes of the lines. Usually slopes of the lines give the
main idea of significance level of a factor on the response in these kinds of plots. A steep
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increase between the means indicates that a factor has a significant effect on the response
variable. A gradual change ends up with the conclusion of a minor effect on the response.
HFR is as a good example of a gradual slope. HARM failure increases make little change
in overall success. On the contrary, the other three factors show significant effects on the
response with their steeper slopes. For NTG, increase in the number of targets gives a
better result in the response. Although this increase generates new increases in the
number of A/G aircraft and in the risk of attrition rate, it concludes a better score in
overall success.
Main Effects Plot for OS
Data Means
NTG

90

SOR

80

OS

70
60
2

4

6

50

SLO

90

100
HFR

80
70
60
10

30

1

25

Figure 14. Main Effects Plot
On the other side, SOR another significant factor on the response introduces an
interesting behavior. When the duration of on-air time of a SAM site increases, it will
make a decrease in the response. Although the vulnerability of SAMs against HARMs
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goes up, the response (overall success) drops off. Obviously SLO has the greatest effect
on the response. As expected, the higher skill level makes a greater decrease in the
response. On the contrary, lower skill level is almost completely unsuccessful.
Figure 15 shows the interactions between two factors among each other and the
response. The different shaded lines stand for each level of the first factor among two
factors examined. The end points of each line represent the two levels of the second
factor. The values at those end points correspond to the response values depending on
these two factors.
In the first subplot, we examined the NTG and SOR factors. There are three levels
with three lines for NTG. The low and high levels of SOR are the end points of those
lines. Their interaction between each factor determines the slope of that line and
corresponding values on the right hand side represent the response variable OS. When
Interaction Plot for OS
Data Means
50

100
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1
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Figure 15. Interaction Plot for OS
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NTG is at its low level which is the black line in this case, the high level of SOR is highly
effective and make a great decrease in the response. When NTG level is increased, the
same decrease in the response is observed as when higher levels of SOR are observed,
but not as sharp slopes as seen in the first one. When SAM sites turn their systems on
during the whole combat they can be more successful against the strikers, but their
success is more evident with a low numbers of targets. When the number of targets
increases, SAM sites cannot find enough time and chance to engage each target.
In the second subplot, we examined NTG and SLO factors interaction on the
response. The value of 10 stands for the high-skilled SAM operators and 30 for lowskilled ones. High level operators have a great impact on the decrease of overall success.
As expected, low level SLO can’t be as successful as the high level. The same result as
seen in the previous subplot provides the same conclusion. When the number of targets
increases, the success for SAM sites will decrease. This provides the result of defending
more than one target with one SAM site makes operators too busy to engage every target.
In the third subplot, NTG and HFR factors are analyzed. There is almost no slope
for each line which means the HARM failure rate does not have a significant effect on the
response. The only change among the three lines comes naturally from the NTG factor, as
discussed the general impact of the change in the number of targets before. The same
ineffectiveness can be observed from the other subplots of HFR on the third column.
Independent of the other factors, HFR cannot make big differences in the response. In
this case, being limited to only eight HARMs on each sortie and the failure rate values
between the values of one and 25% do not make a crucial impact on the survivability of
strikers.
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The last interaction plot examined is the combination of SOR and SLO factors.
The higher level in SLO will give the worse result in response again. Also the high level
in SOR will make the same impact on the response by decreasing the percentage of
overall success. This means despite the fact that being more vulnerable to HARMs, SAM
sites could find more chances to detect and kill their targets.
The interaction between variables was also analyzed. Table 3 shows the
correlation values.
Table 3. Correlation between the Variables
NTG

SOR

SLO

HFR

SOR*SLO

SOR*HFR

SOR*NTG

NTG*SLO

NTG*HFR

NTG

1.00

SOR

0.00

1.00

SLO

0.00

0.00

1.00

HFR

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

SOR*SLO

0.00

0.53

0.80

0.00

1.00

SOR*HFR

0.00

0.32

0.00

0.90

0.17

1.00

SOR*NTG

0.75

0.61

0.00

0.00

0.33

0.20

1.00

NTG*SLO

0.60

0.00

0.74

0.00

0.59

0.00

0.45

1.00

NTG*HFR

0.38

0.00

0.00

0.86

0.00

0.77

0.28

0.23

1.00

SLO*HFR

0.00

0.00

0.44

0.80

0.35

0.72

0.00

0.32

0.69

SLO*HFR

1.00

The correlation between “SOR*HFR” and “HFR” is 0.90. Since they are highly
correlated, addition of the variable “SOR*HFR” may not significantly improve the
model. The other variables were also examined in the same way. After fitting the
regression line to this equation, it is important to investigate the residuals which are the
differences between the observed and predicted values to determine whether or not they
appear to fit the assumption of a normal distribution. Normality is one of the three basic
assumptions of these residuals. A normal probability plot of the standardized residuals is
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shown in the Figure 16. Despite two small light departures on both tails in the data, the
residuals do not seem to deviate from a normal distribution in any systematic manner.
Normal Probability Plot
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Figure 16. Normal Probability Plot of Residuals
Residuals can be thought of as elements of variation unexplained by the fitted
model. Thus the other basic assumption about residuals is constant variance is checked by
a scatter plot, the residuals against the fitted values (Figure 17).
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Figure 17. Residual plots vs. Fitted Values
Plotting residuals versus the value of a fitted response should produce a
distribution of points scattered randomly about zero, regardless of the size of the fitted
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value. If residual values increase as the size of the fitted value increases, the residual
cloud becomes "funnel shaped" with the larger end toward larger fitted values which
means the residuals have a non-constant variance. Although the residuals make a dense
distribution between the values 60 and 100, a funnel shaped residual cloud is not
observed. The scatter in the residuals between 60 and 80 is similar to the scatter in the
residuals between 80 and 100. This suggests that the standard deviation of the residuals is
roughly constant for the responses observed at each value.
After these steps, the regression model is reached. Minitab also provides a
parameter table shown in Table 4 which helps to understand the variables that make a
contribution to the model at different levels.

OS = 40.08 + 2.33NTG − 0.23SOR + 2.75SLO + 0.16 HFR − 0.01SOR ∗ SLO +
(7)

0.06SOR ∗ NTG − 0.15 NTG ∗ SLO
Table 4. Parameter Estimates
Predictor
Intercept
NTG
SOR
SLO
HFR
SOR*SLO
SOR*NTG
NTG*SLO

Coef. (β)
40.082
2.3257
-0.22849
2.7469
0.15828
-0.011166
0.056522
-0.14742

Std.Err.of Coef.
4.143
0.7864
0.04790
0.1373
0.09044
0.001373
0.008407
0.02102

p-values
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.101
0.000
0.000
0.000

As seen on the first column, along with four main factors, three interaction
variables also help to predict the response. The regression coefficients are shown in the
second column. The third column contains the standard errors of the regression
coefficients which can be used for hypothesis testing and constructing confidence
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intervals. P-values or the significance levels for t statistics in the last column tell whether
a variable has statistically significant predictive capability in the presence of the other
variables. A p-value smaller than 0.05 means that variable is statistically significant in the
model at the α = .05 level. In some circumstances, a non-significant p-value might be
used to determine whether to remove a variable from a model without significantly
reducing the model's predictive capability. HFR has a non-significant p-value, however
when it is removed, the model is less significant and the normality plot has larger
deviations than the present one. These p-values should not be used to eliminate more than
one variable at a time. A variable that does not have predictive capability in the presence
of the other predictors may have predictive capability when some of those predictors are
removed from the model.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table (Table 5) explains the variability in the
response variable. The amount of variability can be measured by the Total Sum of
Squares. The ANOVA table partitions this variability into two parts. One portion is fitted
by the regression model and labeled as Regression Sum of Squares. It's the reduction in
uncertainty that occurs when the regression model is used to predict the responses. The
remaining portion is the uncertainty that remains even after the model is used and labeled
as Residual Error Sum of Squares. The model is considered to be statistically significant
if it can account for a large amount of variability in the response.
Table 5. Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
8
15
23

Sum of Squares
6569.45
42.40
6611.85
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Mean Square
821.18
2.83

F Ratio
290.50

p-value
0.000

Mean Squares are the Sums of Squares divided by the corresponding degrees of
freedom. The F Ratio is the test statistic used to decide whether the model as a whole has
statistically significant predictive capability. The null hypothesis states that all regression
coefficients are equal to zero. In other words the model has no predictive capability. The
large values of F statistic provide evidence against null hypothesis and at least one of the
coefficients is different from zero. The p-value for the F statistic is less than 0.001,
providing strong evidence against the null hypothesis.
R2 value is the squared multiple correlation coefficient and gives the proportion of
the variability in the response that is fitted by the model. In this regard, if a model has a
perfect predictability R2 is equal to 1. The Summary of Fit shows these values in Table 6.
As mentioned before the adjusted R2 value makes a correction to the increase in R2 value
when new variables are added that have no additional predictive capability to the model.
In this case, 99% of the variance in the response variable (OS) is explained by the model.
The Root Mean Square Error is the square root of the Residual Mean Square. It is the
standard deviation of the data about the regression line, rather than about the sample
mean.
Table 6. Summary of Fit
R Square
R Square adjusted
Root Mean Square Error

4.4

0.994
0.990
1.683

Comparison of Different Systems
In this section, statistical analyses of the output from two different versions of the

main model that might represent competing system designs is discussed.” The real utility
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of simulation lies in comparing output of these alternative systems” (Law, 2007:548). In
this sense, appropriate statistical methods are essential in making correct conclusions.
Two options to construct confidence intervals for the difference between two
performance measures are available. One is the two-sample-t approach which requires
independence and equal variances but not equal sample size between two systems.
However, equality of variances might not necessarily be a good assumption when
simulating real world systems such as mission level combat systems. Thus a paired-t test
is the other option. The advantage of this approach is it does not require equal variance
and independence between systems. The sample sizes should be equal in this approach.
Another consideration is using common random numbers (CRN) to achieve significant
variance reduction (Law, 2007:555). The same random number streams and seeds is used
for each system to synchronize our use of random numbers. Since this approach
intentionally creates dependence between the systems as a variance reduction technique,
it requires paired-t test approach to construct confidence intervals for the difference
between two performance measures.
Two different systems are used in this study. In the first one, all A/G aircraft use
the same exact time to be over their targets. However, it provides different times for
strikers to cross the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). In the other one, all strikers
use same exact time to cross FEBA and this naturally provides different TOTs for A/G
aircraft. The first system is named as System A, and the second one as System B.
These systems are examined based on how these two different formations effect the
vulnerability time of strikers in the range of SAM sites and the dispersion of HARM
TOTs which are vital for strikers’ survivability and our response variable OS.
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First, how different TOTs and attack methods of these systems affect vulnerability
time was examined. The same design points for both systems were chosen and a paired-t
test between the means was performed.
In Table 7, the first line defines the design points. The letters stand for the system
name, the numbers represent NTG, SOR, SLO, HFR factors in order. First the value of
two for NTG was examined which means there are only two targets in the range. The
other factors don’t have any effect on vulnerability times. As seen on the first two
Table 7. Means of Vulnerability Times For Two Design Points of Each System
A-2-50-10-1 B-2-50-10-1
396.744
396.758
382.531
382.546
357.737
357.753
369.602
369.615
403.936
403.950
356.818
356.832
346.143
346.156
359.698
359.714
355.521
355.538
355.167
355.181
387.925
387.938
347.650
347.665
389.119
389.135
366.425
366.439
404.301
404.314
369.537
369.550
348.729
348.744
371.098
371.113
388.203
388.214
345.134
345.149
401.593
401.606
371.727
371.742
325.201
325.215
399.275
399.291
370.464
370.478

A-6-50-10-1
521.061
503.108
475.343
500.428
503.038
482.712
477.994
484.514
496.863
476.597
501.054
489.361
514.210
482.421
510.993
474.874
488.526
483.558
505.566
470.040
479.007
490.940
455.724
505.694
506.438
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B-6-50-10-1
493.385
476.828
461.608
477.512
470.362
459.474
451.544
459.407
467.177
456.672
474.771
464.104
478.494
460.833
486.652
448.083
461.234
459.106
477.638
453.691
462.224
477.207
432.564
474.657
477.860

columns, the mean values are very close to each other. But the results of paired-t test
(Table 8) which is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis Ho: μA – μB = 0, indicates
rejection of the null hypothesis at the α = .05 level. The confidence interval does not
contain zero and the p-value is smaller than α value. Although vulnerability times of
systems are statistically different from each other, the difference at the second decimal
place in the vulnerability times relating to the systems is clearly not practically significant
when there are only two targets in the range.
Table 8. Paired-t Test for Vulnerability Times (A-2-50-10-1, B-2-50-10-1)
A-2-50-10-1
B-2-50-10-1
Difference
95% CI

N
25
25
25

Mean
StDev
SE Mean
370.81
21.49
4.30
370.83
21.49
4.30
-0.014270 0.001394
0.000279
(-0.014845, -0.013695)

P-Value

0.000

In the third and fourth column of Table 7, the mean values of vulnerability times
for both systems at the value of six for NTG are shown along with results of the paired-t
test (Table 9).
Table 9. Paired-t Test for Vulnerability Times (A-6-50-10-1, B-6-50-10-1)
A-6-50-10-1
B-6-50-10-1
Difference
95% CI

N
25
25
25

Mean
491.20
466.52
24.68

P-Value

StDev
SE Mean
15.79
3.16
13.32
2.66
5.47
1.09
(22.42, 26.94)
0.000

The null hypothesis that these two vulnerability times are statistically same is
rejected. But this time the confidence interval lies well above zero and is larger than the
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first one. This result indicates that A/G aircraft in System A spend more time in the
vulnerability area than A/G aircraft in System B. First it could be thought that all strikers
in System A go into and out of SAM area at once and they have to spend less time in the
target area. Since each A/G target location has a different distance to SAM site, and the
vulnerability time window is calculated from the very first striker’s entering time to the
threat zone until the very last striker’s exit time, it provides a dispersed and larger
exposed time window for strikers.
Since the numbers of SAM sites and A/G targets are not big values such as two
for SAMs and three for A/G targets for each SAM, and the maximum range of SAM sites
is limited to 25, the difference between two means cannot be thought practically
significant. But if these values are increased, the difference between means will get
higher and begin to make things more difficult for attackers.
After finishing systems’ effect on vulnerability time, the difference between the
systems influences our key MOE overall success is discussed. Sixteen design points for
each system are chosen. These points include the low and high values of four factors. By
applying paired-t tests to these points, the following results were observed. Means and
standard deviations of each system, 95% confidence intervals and p-values are listed in
Table 10.
In the first two lines, the systems indicate that they are statistically different from
each other since 95% CIs don’t cover zero and the p-values are smaller than α. For both
design points System B shows better performance than System A. The only difference
between the two design points is HFR. HFR does not have a significant effect on OS. The
ineffectiveness of HFR is discussed later.
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Table 10. Paired-t Test for OS
Design Points
no
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

NTG-SOR-SLO-HFR

6-50-10-1
6-50-10-25
6-50-30-1
6-50-30-25
6-100-10-1
6-100-10-25
6-100-30-1
6-100-30-25
2-50-10-1
2-50-10-25
2-50-30-1
2-50-30-25
2-100-10-1
2-100-10-25
2-100-30-1
2-100-30-25

System A
mean std dev
72.776 2.556
73.176 2.385
98.000 0.531
97.898 0.544
70.700 2.089
66.521 3.122
86.531 1.004
84.225 1.173
56.320 5.613
57.218 5.111
96.802 1.068
96.255 1.318
45.637 3.354
42.547 2.653
72.063 2.562
67.257 3.900

System B
mean std dev
76.918 1.981
74.939 2.346
98.188 0.507
97.748 0.581
70.935 2.574
69.554 2.791
87.764 1.142
86.178 1.186
62.080 4.522
60.963 4.784
96.213 1.308
96.027 1.296
51.313 5.499
49.113 4.720
71.990 3.878
68.935 3.779

95% CI
-5.001 , -3.281
-2.725 , -0.802
-0.468 , 0.092
-0.220 , 0.521
-1.546 , 1.076
-4.811 , -1.257
-1.672 , -0.795
-2.506 , -1.400
-7.688 , -3.832
-5.940 , -1.550
-0.108 , 1.285
-0.557 , 1.014
-8.260 , -3.100
-8.483 , -4.650
-1.653 , 1.800
-3.218 , -0.139

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.177
0.409
0.714
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.094
0.554
0.000
0.000
0.930
0.034

In the following two lines, a decrease in SLO from the first two lines is observed.
A/G aircraft will be more successful when the skill levels of operators decrease. The rise
in the mean values is an obvious proof of this development and these OS values are the
highest ones among all these design points. At the same time, it cannot be said this
change creates a difference between two systems as seen by. Failing to reject these
systems are statistically different from each other for both design points at SLO value of
30 sec.
In the fifth and sixth lines, the SOR and SLO level is increased to their high
values. In line five, no difference between two systems is observed but in line six the
effect of HFR on OS is seen. By decreasing OS value from 70.7 to 66.5, HFR provides a
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statistical difference between System A and System B. In this case, HFR acted as a key
factor with the high levels of SOR and SLO on changing OS value.
In lines seven and eight, no statistical difference between competing systems is
observed. The major reason for this result is the high level of SOR accompanying with
low level of SLO. As mentioned before, the high level of SOR make an interesting
decrease in OS although SAM sites spend more time exposed to the threat of HARMs.
The remaining lines in Table 9 are a repeat of the same factor levels in the top of
the table with a change in NTG value. The number of targets in the combat area is
decreased from six to two. In lines nine and ten, no statistical difference between two
systems is noted. However, comparing the mean response values with lines one and two,
there is a great decrease in OS values. It indicates that, when the number of targets
decreases in the area, SAM operators find more chances to engage their targets. Thus,
they can detect and kill more aircraft which results in lower values of OS.
In lines 11 and 12, the highest scores of OS are seen again after six target versions
of these design points. It proves the same idea above about the effect of the number of
targets on OS. The same results for the rest of the designs are observed. Here again, the
results fail to reject the claim that these systems are statistically the same. In lines 13 and
14, better results with System B are shown and in lines 15 and 16, a significant effect of
HFR on the results is observed. A high value for HFR shows System B is better in the
last comparison.
The results and comments are discussed next. As opposed to our original
expectations, System B showed better performance in most comparisons. Although the
high values of SOR make an increase in exposed time to HARMs, the overall success
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decreased. When the number of A/G targets and normally the number of A/G aircraft
decrease in the range of SAM sites, SAMs killed more and gave a significant damage to
Blue side. This shows the importance that EW assets should increase suppression with
jamming to make SAM sites busy and inoperative. With few exceptions, HFR has no
effect on the results. Since only eight HARMs are used in each sortie and the probability
of failure rate cannot be too high, this result was no surprise. Finally the skill level of
operators could be vital for both sides. When the value of SLO decreases, Blue side
success increases. When SLO increases, Red inflicts greater damage to its opponent.

4.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, output analysis was discussed. First the appropriate length and

number of replications of the model to produce necessary outputs was determined. The
factors contributing to the model were then examined which resulted in a regression
analysis with a factorial design. Finally the results of different competing systems were
analyzed and conclusions about the factors in the model were drawn. Chapter 5 will
discuss the highlights of this study.
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V. Conclusion

5.1

Introduction
The previous four chapters presented the research that was undertaken. First a

brief summary of SEAD mission evolution was introduced followed by a literature
review on simulation, combat modeling and previous studies on related subjects. Next,
important model details and information was provided. The last section analyzed the
outputs of the model and provided conclusions. This chapter will give highlights from the
previous chapters and make conclusions and recommendations for future research.

5.2

Summary of the Research
The objective of this research was to build a responsive and flexible model using

a discrete event simulation to investigate the effectiveness of a simplified SEAD scenario
with its different factors. Thus simulation cannot by itself be a perfect representation of
real world, the plan was to build a mission level model with enough details to draw
conclusions. First the important factors that should be included in the model to represent
a SEAD mission were designed. Several assumptions were made to keep the model
feasible and simple. After determining the entities and main states of the entities, model
construction began.
Movement, detection and searching were the major challenges for a combat
model in an event-stepped simulation. After developing the main model, minor changes
were made to the model to mirror real-world situations. These models involved the
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characteristics of our design points which were used in regression analysis. The models
were run for 10 days with 25 replications. Outputs from these different models were
captured. The most important measure of effectiveness which is OS was evaluated. The
study concluded with analysis and comments of the results.

5.3

Conclusions of the Research
Four main factors were used in the model. These factors are SAM on-air rate

(SOR), HARM failure rate (HFR), skill level of SAM operators (SLO) in terms of
seconds to react to A/G aircraft and the number of A/G targets for each SAM site (NTG).
The key MOE was determined as overall success (OS). Also two different systems were
built to make comparisons. In System A, all A/G flights use only one TOT. In System B,
A/G flights use different TOTs but same FEBA crossing time.
The results of the research show that when the exposure times of Red SAM sites
against Blue HARMs increase, the higher levels of SOR always decrease Blue OS level.
When NTG decreases, the success of Red SAM sites proportionally increases. It indicates
that when the busy time of SAM operators and systems drops, they are more lethal
against Blue forces. Naturally SLO provides results as expected and shows that skill level
of operators significantly effects system performance. Finally HFR is the most ineffective
factor in this research. Because of the low number of HARMs, HFR does not make major
effects on the scores.
Another result is System A causes Blue A/G aircraft to spend more time in the
range of Red SAM sites which increases the vulnerability time of System A over System
B. Because of that reason, System B shows a higher Blue OS in most of the runs.
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5.4

Recommendations for Future Study
The model can be enhanced by increasing the scope of this simulation. A

simplified scenario of a SEAD mission was modeled. The number of SAM sites, targets,
SEAD and A/G flight are limited. By increasing these numbers with minor logic changes
in the model, more representative system performance could be captured. Model fidelity
could be significantly increased by adding A/A, EW capabilities, intelligence and EOB
update processes in support of these missions.
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